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SUBJECT Population Analysis

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1. Despite the fundamental importance of population in the analysis of the economic problems of China, no scientific basis has yet been constructed for a determination of the exact size and characteristics of the Chinese people. No less than forty-seven estimates have been made on the population of China by individuals and institutions, but none of them can be said to bear any substantial relation to the facts. (1) The difference between the maximum and the minimum of these estimates would approach the total population of the United States of America. The official figure of 463 million for Greater China as of January 1948 has been considered "unreliable to the second digit." (2)
2. Historical population statistics: Historically, China possesses a long and unbroken record of population statistics embodied principally in such encyclopedic works as T'ung Tien, T'ung K'ao, T'ung Chi, Hui Tien, and Tung Hua Lu. Indeed the traditional census and registration in China antedate the Christian era. The beginning of population records is ascribed to the Chou Dynasty (1124-244 B.C.) Registers of households and individuals are said to have been established during the Western Han Dynasty (204 B.C. - 9 A.D.), and were continued more or less regularly throughout succeeding generations. A theoretical basis for current population reporting was contained in the pao-chia system, a pyramidal organization founded upon small family groups traceable back to the Sung Dynasty (960-1278 A.D.). Nevertheless, there has never been in China a census in the modern sense of the word.

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3. The traditional function of historical population statistics in China has been to serve the sovereign as instruments of social management, labor and military conscription, and over-all police control. Chinese census and registration systems were designed primarily to supply the sovereign with certain items of information which he deemed important for his administration. Among other matters he wants to know the number of the tax payers, who, beside tilling the private lands, could cultivate the public lands; the able bodied males who could construct public works in peace and bear arms in war; and of those who were financially able to pay taxes to his regime." (3) The statistics collected for these restricted purposes of necessity covered only portions of the population. With the abolition of the poll tax in 1712 in the Ming Dynasty, it became possible to enumerate the entire population, both tax-payers and non-taxpayers. But, the provincial authorities, who no longer had any fiscal interest, completely neglected the task; often times, they either reported the previous figures without checking them at all or deliberately exaggerated the number of people in order to present a state of prosperity to the reigning emperor.
4. Historical population statistics in China may be considered by-products of a police system. The pac-chia system, from which emanated most of the historical population data, divided the nation into small groups of families, each group was then held responsible for the conduct of its members and for the provision of public labor and military service. Since every individual could be allocated to a family, the government which controlled the group as organized had indirect control over the individual. At the stratum of the Chinese social structure, therefore, the family served as the medium through which the government could maintain effective supervision over the population. Traditional census procedures designed primarily to keep the populace under police surveillance set up the household as the basic unit for reporting and registration. Little value could be placed on any statistical data derived from such a system.
5. The census and registration systems of China in the past by the very nature of their goals inevitably resulted in the purposeful omission of children and women and in the avoidance of registration on the part of male adults. The historical population data of China contains errors of such magnitude that they distort completely the true demographic conditions of their respective periods and made comparison over time of very dubious validity.
6. "Censuses" of the Twentieth Century: The three major "Censuses" of the twentieth century - those of 1909-1911, 1928 and 1958 - were all defective since none of them incorporated a direct count of all the inhabitants in the country through a staff of enumerators employed by the central government. The "Census" of 1909-1911 was motivated by the desire of the Imperial Government to obtain a basis for the popular election of representatives for a constitutional government which the Manchu regime, prompted by the movement for reform since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, apparently made a serious attempt to adopt. The order for the "census" was proclaimed in 1906, but only the Three Eastern Provinces sent in their returns. This having failed, the Imperial Government proclaimed an edict in 1908 ordering a census of households in 1909 and, later, also a census of individual persons. For both these enumerations, the field procedure was to entrust the task to the local officials of various ranks: to the village headmen in rural areas and to the police in urban centers. (4)
7. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1911, two other attempts have been made at census-taking. First, the government in Peking, adopting the fundamental procedure of the 1909-1911 census, ordered another census for 1912. The returns as published in installments in 1914 and 1915 in the Ministry of Interior Statistical Report of 1912 included all provinces except three. Second, after the formation of the Nationalist Government in Nanking in 1927 and with the re-introduction of the pac-chia system for police surveillance, a census was undertaken for the country in 1928, and a report of the results was attached in 1931. The procedure followed was for the police to serve as enumerators in municipalities and provincial capitals and for the people to report verbally to the chiefs of pac and chia in other areas. In both these attempts of 1912 and 1928 under the Republican era as in the one in 1909-1911 under the Manchu regime the essential pre-requisites for a modern census enumeration were completely lacking.

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8. Current estimates: Since 1928 no attempt has been made in China at census enumeration. Official estimates of the population are, however, currently compiled and published despite the absence of an adequate census base line or postcensal data on vital statistics and migration. The sources of the estimates differ from region to region and from year to year. Estimates for the municipalities and provincial capitals are usually based on police surveys, while those for the provinces are assumed to represent compilations of pao-chia enumerations transmitted from the hsien magistrates to the provincial authorities and, thence, to the central government. Methods of estimation vary; a common procedure is to check earlier reports based likely on those of 1909-1911, 1912 or 1928, and to transmit the data intact or to make evaluative adjustments at random. Thus, errors in the current population data of China can seldom be chance deviations of unbiased estimation.
9. Table I gives the official figures, both for the entire country and by regions, on the estimated population of China for 1947, 1946 and 1944 together with the figures for two previous periods, 1932-1933 and 1909-1911, which have been reconstructed by Wang Shih-ta on the basis of the 1928 and 1909-1911 censuses respectively. For the whole of Greater China, the figures range from 368 million as of 1909-1911 to 461 million in 1947, showing an annual increase of approximately one-half per cent during the thirties, very little change during the war period but a sharp rise after the war in 1946-1947. For the eighteen provinces of China Proper, the figures indicate an increase until the late war years, and then a decline from 1944 to 1946. For the frontier regions, we note a great decline in 1944 and a rise in 1947 for Manchuria and Jehol, and an increase in 1944 but a sharp drop in 1947 for the Western area including Tsinghai, Sikang, Sinkiang and Tibet. Most of the changes, particularly those for the frontier region, are extremely erratic, revealing the obvious inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the data.

Table I

Area	Estimated Population of China				
	1947(1)	1946(2)	1944(3)	1932-33(4)	1909-11(5)
Total	461,006	455,592	454,666	429,494	368,147
The 18 Provinces	397,520	392,183	408,466	386,850	341,825
North China	103,173	100,120	98,158	94,861	79,151
Central China	161,014	158,827	166,611	154,889	140,009
South China	133,333	133,236	143,697	137,100	122,565
Manchuria & Jehol	44,294	41,822	28,542	32,289	21,582
Western area (Tsinghai, Sikang, Sinkiang & Tibet)	8,009	10,424	10,734	4,882	3,246
Taiwan	6,126	6,336			
Inner Mongolia (Ninghsia, Suiyuan & Chahar)	5,054	4,829	4,844	4,569	688
Outer Mongolia			2,078	905	325
Others (the marshes of Szechuan & Yunnan)					479

Figures for 1950 are (000 omitted):

Total - 483,869
 19 Provinces - 419,829
 Manchuria & Jehol - 43,000
 Western Area - 7,803
 Taiwan - 6,384
 Inner Mongolia - 6,853

In addition, totals for 1949 are 472 million
 and for 1948 463 million.

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remaining 83% of her territory is only 35 persons per square mile. Indeed the western provinces of Sikang, Tsinghai, Ningxia, Tibet and Sinkiang, comprising over two-thirds of the total area of China, have an average density of less than 8 persons per square mile.

13. The uneven distribution of China's population should not suggest spatial redistribution as an answer to the problem of the pressure of the Chinese people on the land. George Cressey has well said: "The sparsely settled areas have less population-supporting capacity and are already as crowded as the others. The dense areas are dense because conditions of livelihood are more attractive." (5) One may travel for miles in some of the remote regions in China without seeing a single house, but as soon as he comes to some arable land, even on steep hillsides, he will note the utilization of the soil to its maximum capacity.
14. Two frontier regions of China, in particular, the northwestern region and the northeastern region have frequently been considered as offering possible outlets for Chinese people from the dense areas in China proper. Under the present stage of agricultural development in technique and organization, the northeastern frontier region which consists of the three eastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang may have the capacity to support a total population of 75 million. Since the present population of Manchuria, according to the official figure as of 1947, amounts to less than 40 million, there may be sufficient room for additional population of 35 to 40 million. In the northwestern frontier region, however, the possibility for further agricultural development has been much exaggerated. Limited by topography, extensive areas of desert and, in particular, scarcity of rainfall, the northwestern frontier region has its arable land confined principally to some small alluvial plains, namely: The Lower Weiho Plain in Shensi; Suiyuan Plain; Hetao Plain north of Huangho and west of Paotow in Suiyuan Province; Ninghsia Plain; West Kansu oasis which includes the three districts of Liangchow, Kanchow and Szechow, and, finally, the oasis along the foot of Kunlunshan and Tienshan and the small plain of Ili Valley in Sinkiang Province.
15. The total agricultural land of these plains in the northwestern frontier region has been estimated at 47,000 square miles, or less than half of the Manchurian plain, with the climate and soil much less favorable. The rainfall of the five plains range from 10 to at most 20 inches per year; agriculture has to depend, therefore, largely on artificial irrigation. On the assumption of 300 persons per square mile in density, the agricultural land in the five plains may have the capacity to support a maximum of 14 million people. Considering the already existing population, the possible increase in the Lower Weiho Plain, Suiyuan Plain, Hetao Plain and Ninghsia Plain can not exceed 500,000 each. The West Kansu oasis may absorb an additional population of 2 million at most, while Sinkiang, which has at present a population of approximately 5 million, may support another 3 to 4 million people. Under traditional agricultural techniques, the total possible increase of population in the northwestern frontier regions can not exceed 8 million. With the development of some irrigation projects and the introduction of mechanized dry farming, both of which obviously require heavy capital investment and political stability not presently available in China, the possibility of agricultural expansion in the northwestern frontier region may become more important.
16. Vital characteristics: As important as the size, density and geographical distribution of China's population are its vital characteristics, but here again comprehensive and reliable statistics are lacking. The official estimate of the sex ratio of the Chinese people at all ages as of 1947 is 110.01, (6) whereas the results of several case studies in certain small, selected communities average 111.25. (7) The sex ratio at birth of 103.02 from Ta Chen's investigation in Cheng Kung, while indicating a relatively greater number of girls born, reflects a proportionately higher mortality among female children due to negligence and possibly infanticide. (8) Birth and death rates in China are known only through special enquiries covering in each case a very small sample population. A study in Kiangyin, a community of about 20,000 inhabitants in the Yangtze delta, during the period of 1931-1935 showed an annual birth rate of 45.1 and an annual death rate of 38.7 per 1,000 population, with an infant mortality rate of 240.9 per 1,000 live births. These rates, especially

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the death rate, were considered by those who conducted the enquiry to be too low. (9) Early in 1923, the University of Nanking reported a birth rate of 58.4 and a death rate of 37.1 in a study made in Yes Shan, Hopei Province. (10) In the Tin Hsien Health Area, the birth rate for a population of 14,000 in 1934 was found to be 39.6 in 1933-34. The death rate dropped from 29.2 in 1933 to 23.8 in 1934 and again increased to 29.1 in 1935. (11) For an earlier period in 1931, Franklin C. H. Lee, in his Social Survey of Ting Hsien, reported the birth rate to be 37.1 and the death rate to be 33.7 in 1931. (12) John Lossing Buck's study, which covered a population of over 200,000 located in sixteen different provinces in North China and South China during the period 1929-1931, showed an annual birth rate of 38.3 per 1,000 married females 15-44 years of age and an annual death rate of 27.1 per 1,000 population. (13) On the basis of the existing data collected from the various case studies, Ta Chen estimated that the birth rate of China in 1934 was 38 per 1,000 population, the death rate, 33 per 1,000 population, and the infant mortality rate, 275 per 1,000 live births. (14)

7. It may be safely presumed that China's birth rate exceeds 40 per 1,000 population. While there may be cases revealing lower rates, such as in metropolitan centers or among the modern educated classes, they are by far outnumbered by those in rural areas where sustained birth rates of 40 to 45 prevail. The custom of early marriage and the universality of marriage in China lend supporting evidence to the high fertility of China's population. The model age groups for marriage of men in China fall between the ages of 18 and 20, while those of women fall between the ages of 16 to 19. In fact, few of the women in China marry after age 25, while the number of women marrying after age 30 appears practically negligible. Of all men at the age of 15 and over included in the sample studies of Kiang Ying, Tingsien, and Chen Kung, the proportion of unmarried was 15.70%, 16.62% and 8.18%, but that of married was 66.50%, 67.02% and 81.95% respectively. The degree of universality of marriage of the Chinese women is even more conspicuous. The proportion of unmarried to the total women included in the same sample studies in Kiang Ying, Tingsien and Chen Kung was 9%, 7.31% and 6.01%, but that of the married was 71.8%, 75.00% and 74.51% respectively. (15) Buck reported in his sample study only two or three women in every thousand remaining single at the age of thirty (16)

8. "The death rate of China's population, on the other hand, probably averages 40 per 1,000 population, at any rate, it seldom falls below 35 and then only under conditions quite exceptional in China such as in small, isolated areas with public health facilities or during a short period of relative peace and political stability. With the living level of the great mass of the people still at the state of grinding poverty, disease and ignorance, and in view of the pressure of frequent wars, famines and other natural catastrophes, it would be very surprising indeed to witness any sustained decline in the death rate of China's population.

The trend of the natural increase of China's population is not predictable. Ta Chen's estimate of 139 years and Buck's estimate of 65 years for a doubling of China's present population are merely intellectual conjectures. (17) In China today, as in Europe before the eighteenth century, with both birth and death rates very high and the latter extremely variable, rising from time to time to devastating levels as a result of wars, famines and epidemics, the growth of China's population is naturally very irregular and not possible of statistical forecast. Increases during stretches of favorable years are always terminated by sharp drops when one or another of the recurrent calamities strikes. Mortality, rather than fertility which is resistant to change, constitutes the determining factor for the presence or absence of growth in China's population. Given prevalence of peace and order in the country for a reasonable period of time, it is possible to expect a decline in mortality which, though probably slow in rate, will nevertheless be sufficient to yield a tremendous absolute growth. During the last half century, however, the population of China can scarcely have grown; even so, the rate of growth would be negligible.

Age structure: Three major age classes may be used for the analysis of the age structure of China's population, namely: 0-14 years of age, 15-59 years of age, and 60 years old and over. Children under 15 years of age usually represent a dependent group, though in China, where the standard of living is relatively low, many of them are engaged to some extent in economic activities; persons 15 to 60 years old constitute the source of the

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majority of the economically active population and include practically all of the productive elements of the population; persons 60 years and over, are mostly disabled and dependent. In accordance with these three major classes and on the basis of the available data collected in the several experimental census areas in China, the age structure of China's population has been estimated as follows: (18)

	Reasonable	Optimistic	Conservative
All ages	100%	100%	100%
0-14 years of age	40%	36%	44%
15-59 years of age	55%	57%	51%
60 years old and above	5%	7%	5%

21. The salient characteristics of the age structure of China's population is obviously the high proportion of children under 15 years of age in comparison with the number of adults. As shown in the above, from 36% to 44% of the total population of China falls in the group of 0-14 years of age; whereas the proportion of persons aged 60 years and over is from 5% to 7% and that in the age group of 15 to 59, from 51% to 57%. The age distribution of the population in the United States and Canada as of 1947 is: under 15, 25%; 15-59, 54% and 60 years and over, 21% (19)
22. The youthfulness of the population of China is the result of the combined influences of a high birth rate and a high death rate. The former means that children are numerous in proportion to adults of productive ages, while the latter results in the survival of relatively few persons to the old age. "The age structure of a population," said Notestein, "is the living record of biological history. Population with high fertility and mortality are young because of failure to survive and because there is usually some growth. Those with low fertility and mortality are old, because individuals survive longer and because each age class represents the survivors of larger number of births than the next younger." (20)--
23. The relatively high proportion of children under 15 years found in the population of China has had an important bearing on the standard of living of her people and on the problems of her economic development. Most of the persons under the ages of 15 and over 59 years of age are dependents relying for a greater part of their support on those between 15 and 59 years old. The need to support such large numbers of dependents places a heavy burden on the adults of working age. Besides, a nation with a "younger" population suffers a severe economic handicap in terms of the great human waste of morality.
24. Population movement: Since the beginning of the twentieth century Chinese population movements have been characterized by three major phenomena: first, the overseas emigration to regions in southeastern Asia, especially Siam, Malaya and Netherlands Indies; second, the colonization of the northeastern frontier of Manchuria; and, third, the interprovincial migration during the recent war with Japan. By the first decade of the present generation, Chinese immigration had become practically a closed question to the English speaking countries in the Pacific in the face of their rigid exclusion policies. Subsequently, the British and the Dutch colonies in southeastern Asia, Siam and the Philippines constituted the main outlets for Chinese overseas emigration. The magnitude of this emigration, however, has been relatively insignificant. One author estimated in 1932 that during the long period of Chinese migration abroad less than 2% of China's population had actually emigrated. (21) Indeed the total number of Chinese living overseas at the present time amounts to only 8,700,000. (22) Of these 96% are in Asiatic countries, and 71% in Siam, Malaya and Netherlands Indies. Only 1% are living in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and less than 1% in countries in Europe.
25. The majority of the Chinese in southeastern Asia are from the province of Fukien, whereas those in North, Central and South America are almost exclusively from Kwangtung. The economic status of the overseas Chinese varies from that of manual worker to that of retail merchant, but by far the greatest number are in the former category. In Malaya, for instance, Chinese laborers made up as much as 90% of the total laboring force for the period from 1929 to 1934 (23). In Siam it has been estimated that 76% of the working class in Bangkok is Chinese. (24) Under the pressure of increasing restriction in the immigrating countries and cut off entirely from adequate protection by their own government, the Chinese emigrants abroad encounter enormous difficulties which tend to weaken considerably the "pull" force of the migratory movement, although the strength of the "push" factor in their home land remains as great as ever.

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26. Since the removal of the official barrier to migration into Manchuria in 1878 a steady stream of Chinese peasants from Shantung, Honan, and Hopei has flowed into the three northeastern frontier provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. The population of Manchuria at the beginning of the twentieth century was estimated to have reached 14 million, of whom 80% were Chinese. For the ten to fifteen years prior to 1920, Chinese immigration amounted to between 300,000 and 400,000 annually, but one half to three-quarters of them returned each year to China Proper after the harvest in Manchuria. (25) As shown by the table below, however, the decade prior to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 witnessed a change in the size as well as in the nature of the migration stream. During the years from 1927 to 1929 the number of immigrants for permanent settlement was especially large. At the peak in 1927, indeed, 1.2 million people entered Manchuria from China Proper and only about one-fourth of them returned.

Chinese immigration into Manchuria
1923-1939 (in 1,000)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Entered</u>	<u>Returned</u>	<u>Permanently Remained</u>
1923	433.7	286.8	146.9
1924	492.5	232.7	259.8
1925	532.8	214.6	318.2
1926	607.4	299.4	308.0
1927	1,159.7	316.6	843.2
1928	1,074.5	381.1	693.4
1929	1,046.3	601.4	444.9
1930	748.2	488.5	259.7
1931	767.4	461.3	6.1
1932	414.0	498.8	84.7
1933	619.9	497.2	121.7
1934	690.9	439.6	251.3
1935	519.6	495.0	24.6
1936	358.1	366.8	8.6
1937	319.3	259.1	60.2
1938	492.4	252.8	239.6
1939	986.0	391.0	595.0
1940	1,300.9	847.1	453.8

It should be noted that the years 1920-1930 were characterized by growing civil strife in North China, while Manchuria remained largely immune. Famine in Shantung and Hopei, especially during 1926-1927, was another factor in swelling the numbers, particularly of those who migrated as permanent settlers rather than as seasonal laborers.

27. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent restriction upon the immigration of Chinese laborers changed the situation considerably. During the period from 1931 to 1938 inclusive, only 600,000 of the 3.9 million entering Chinese remained permanent settlers. In 1932 there was a net loss of 84,000; but by 1934 there was a net gain of 251,000; in 1935 this was reduced to 24,000; and in 1936 there was again a net loss of 8,600. In 1937 the net immigration was 60,000, but in the next year it rose to 239,600 as a result of the increasing demand for labour in the growing industrial areas. More striking than the falling off of the volume of immigration and settlement was the occupational shift of the Chinese immigrants from agriculture to industry. In 1937, for instance, out of 319,000 immigrants, 50,000 were employed in agriculture, but in 1938 the comparative figures were 492,000 and 27,000. From 1938 onwards the demand for industrial labor in Manchuria grew apace under the stimulus of war needs. Consequently, the number of Chinese immigrants exceeded once more the annual million mark in 1940. The bulk of them was of course directed into urban occupations. Thus, the tide of Chinese agrarian settlement in Manchuria was sharply checked during the entire period of the Japanese occupation.

28. Chinese migration to Manchuria, in particular previous to 1931, represents a spontaneous population movement from agricultural areas of high density to areas of low density. Forced by oppression of war, famine and pinching poverty, the Chinese peasants in North China could not hold to their own home land. They left for Manchuria as migrants without option. They were not given any land in the form of free homesteads. Invariably, they worked as tenants or farm hands upon their arrival, thus depending for their livelihood

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on land. These managers and land owners are the gentry. The economic system thus created in Manchuria was by no means a land reform because it actually put the colonization and the control of a landowner's estate primarily concerned with the maintenance of his own ill-gotten wealth.

29. The interprovincial population movement in China during the recent Sino-Japanese War started soon after the opening of hostilities in North China in 1937 and spread gradually to other parts of the country, proceeding usually in the direction and progress of the invasion of the enemy. In contrast to those of the other movements referred to above, the interprovincial migrants during the recent war were largely well-to-do and educated people including, among others, business executives, factory managers, physicians, engineers, school teachers, students and skilled workmen. The majority of them, at first, did not intend to go very far from their home communities but were forced by pressure of later circumstances to continue moving onward until finally they arrived at the interior regions of Southwestern and Northwestern China. It is estimated that 3,500,000 from twenty-four strategic cities, or 25% of their total population, and 10,750,000 from seventeen occupied provinces, or 5% of their total population, emigrated to Southwestern and Northwestern China during the war period. Many of them have returned to their original homes since V.J. Day, but have found it necessary or advantageous to remain in their adopted communities as permanent settlers.
30. Mention may also be made of the rural-urban movement of population during the last several decades in China. "To the cities in the river valleys and along the coast, such as Shanghai, Wunih, Hankow, Canton and Tientsin, continuous streams of migrants have come from their homes in the hinterland villages." (26) However, this cityward movement of population in China has been largely sporadic and temporary; it consists usually of refugees - victims of war, floods, famine and social unrest - or of individuals, usually young men, obliged to seek work in the winter or for the year round, returning home at the end of the year or after a period of years. Least frequent is where one would leave home with his family for permanent settlement. The rural-urban population movement involves an occupational as well as a spatial re-distribution of the labor supply; its magnitude and continuation are largely dependent on the degree of industrialization and the rate of capital accumulation necessary for industrial expansion. While there is in China an appreciable "push" from the country toward the more urban areas because of population pressure and disorganized economic conditions, the "pull" of the urban centers has been much exaggerated. There can scarcely have been much capital accumulation in China during the recent decades. Chinese cities must have long reached a saturation point in their capacity to absorb and sustain the stream of migrants from the hinterland and the immediate adjacent country sides. Due to retarded industrial development, China's urbanization is yet a very insignificant phenomenon; her present urban population cannot safely be estimated at more than 10% of the total population.
31. Summary - The extreme paucity of adequate census and vital statistics in China makes her demographic picture incomplete and even vague at many points. With a large population unevenly distributed, China has very high densities in arable regions averaging about 100 persons per square mile, but rising in some areas to above 1,000 persons per square mile. These densities refer to multitudes of peasants struggling for a living from the soil. The scarcity of arable land in China in relation to the size of her agricultural labor force is a real one. Indeed, China has a serious problem of agricultural over-population. The vital pattern of China's population is wasteful; the combined force of a high birth rate and a high death rate results, presumably, in a very low rate of natural increase. While the custom of early marriage and universality of marriage, on the one hand, and the prevalence of wars, famines and epidemics, on the other, constitute sufficient causes for the high fertility and mortality rates, the estimated age structure of her population, which appears to be young and stationary, is the inevitable consequence of her present wasteful vital pattern. Population movements, whether on an international scale or within the national boundaries of China, have been of relative insignificance since the first decade of the twentieth century. They have been largely sporadic and without any organized guidance or positive direction, and have not materially alleviated the population pressure of the home country.
32. China's population is still at the "High Stationary" stage where a combination of high mortality and high fertility prevails. With the industrialization of the country there will come the danger of a population explosion which may end in tragedy. A period of economic modernization will bring China, as it did Europe, to the "Early Expanding" stage in her population growth at which the death rate falls while the birth rate remains constant or even rises. "The reduction of mortality," said Notestein, "is a universally

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acceptable goal and faces no social obstacles. But, the reduction of fertility requires a shift in social goals from those directed toward the survival of the group to those directed toward the welfare and the development of the individual. This change, both of goals and of the social equipment by which they are achieved, is at best a slow process. As a result, the period of modernization is virtually certain to yield rapid population increase." (27) In China, where the base population is large, the increase would be so tremendous that most of the product of modernization would probably be absorbed by such growth and would contribute nothing toward the improvement of the living conditions of the people.

33. How much time would have to elapse before fertility started to decline in China under the impact of modernization? In England, after the Industrial Revolution started, more than one hundred years passed before the birth rate commenced to drop. In China, where family organization is the base of existence and the unit of society, the custom of early marriage and the universality of marriage, the ways in which the individual finds his place among his fellows, the questions of economic security and social prestige of women, the religion of ancestor worship and the Confucian teaching of filial piety are all oriented toward the stimulation of high reproductivity, it would normally take at least as many decades as England to bring about a decline of fertility in response to the forces of industrialization. Those who regard industrialization as a panacea for China's economic problems should be aware of its immediate, critical repercussions on population growth. The shorter the lag between the fall in mortality and the fall in fertility in China under the impact of industrialization, the better it will prove for the well-being of the Chinese people and for the peace of the world.

34.

Changes in China's Population Since 1741
Unit - Million

1741	143	(1) Rate of growth decreasing during 180 years under review.
49	178	(2) Rate - 15.14 for 1741 to 1793
59	195	" - 4.95 for 1793 to 1849
64	206	" - 0.81 for 1849 to 1923
71	215	(3) Formula: $P' = P(1 + r)^N$
76	268	(4) Reasons for the change in rate of growth
81	280	(a) 1741-1793, period of prosperity under the Manchurian rule.
85	289	(b) 1793-1849
1790	302	(c) 1849-1923
83	313	
1795	297	
1800	295	
05	332	
11	359	
14	317	
1821	356	
25	380	
1830	395	
35	402	
1840	413	
45	421	
1849	413	
1885	378	
1894	421	
1902	440	
1906	438	
1910	438	
1923	443	

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Footnote References

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- (2) Balfour, M. C. and others. Public health and demography in the Far East. 1950. p. 71
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- (4) The results of the 1909-1911 census were embodied in five reports, one of which was not compiled and published until 1912. The names of the reports are: First Summary Report of Households to the Throne, 1909; Detailed Report of Households to the Provincial and Territorial Authorities, 1909; Second Summary Report of Households to the Throne, with an Incomplete Preliminary Report of Individuals, 1910; Second Detailed Report of Households to the Provincial and Territorial Authorities, 1910; Third Report of Households and Individuals, 1912.
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- (8) Ibid. P. 19
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- (10) Miscellaneous Series in Agriculture. No. 13, University of Nanking, Nanking, 1924.
- (11) C.C. Chen. The Rural Public Health Experiment in Ting Hsien, China.
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- (13) Buck, J. L. Land Utilization in China. 1937. PP 368-397
- (14) Ta Chen. op. cit., P 38
- (15) Ibid. P 40
- (16) Buck, J.L. op. cit., P 379
- (17) Ta Chen, op. cit., P 38; Buck, J. L., op. cit., P 395
- (18) By Chia-lin Pan of the Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat. The local census age data for a number of experimental areas are tested for accuracy on the basis of the adjusted Lx values of the Life Table for Formosa native population, 1926-1930. Defective Chinese age data are excluded from the following table.

Percentage of Total Population in 3 Major Age Groups

District	0-14	15-59	60 & over
Kiang Ying (1932)	40.2	54.7	5.1 a/
Chu Yung (1933)	40.6	54.9	4.5 a/
Kiang Ning (1933)	38.9	55.6	5.5 a/
Nine Hsiens in Szechuan Province (1942-43)	37.1	52.8	10.1 b/
Lan Hsi (1936)	36.3	57.7	6.0 b/
China (Sample 1929-1931)	34.9	57.4	7.7
Cheng Kung (1939)	34.8 c/	57.7	7.5 a/
Kunming Lake Region (1942)	33.7 c/	60.5 d/	5.8 a/
Ting Hsien (1934)	33.3 c/	57.8	8.9 a/ b/

- a/ Data were originally given for 10 year age groups, including the 55-64 age group. The percentage for those aged 60-64 was estimated on the basis of the corresponding Lx value of the aforesaid life table.
- b/ Values of 8% and over are implausible (cf. age structure of Japan, see Pop. Chapter in ECAFE Survey for 1949).
- c/ Values under 35% are implausible (cf. age structure of Japan, see Pop. Chapter in ECAFE Survey for 1949).
- d. Implausible if not affected by immigration.

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- end -

811	1L
811	21L
811	31L
811	81L
811	41L
811	11L
811	193L
811	421L
811	121L
811.6	1L/C
811.52	1L/C
811.51	1L/C
811.1	1L/C
811.2	1L/C
812.2	1L(AL)

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